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Gutting the Fourth Amendment: Judicial 
Complicity in Racial Profiling and the 
Real-Life Implications 
Mary N. Beall† 
Introduction 
Thirteen years, eleven months, twenty-two days, and 
approximately forty-six police stops filled the time between 
Philando Castile’s first and final traffic stop.1  The majority of Mr. 
Castile’s interactions with Minnesota’s law enforcement officers 
were initiated pursuant to minor traffic infractions and only six stop 
records detailed traffic violations that the stopping officer could 
have been aware of from outside the car, such as speeding, blocking 
an intersection, or improperly displaying his license plate.2  On July 
6, 2016, Officer Jeronimo Yanez reported to dispatch that he was 
pulling over Mr. Castile’s vehicle because the occupants “just look 
like the people that were involved in a robbery . . . .  [T]he driver 
looks more like one of our suspects just because of the wide set [sic] 
nose.”3  After being pulled over, Mr. Castile and Officer Yanez 
exchanged greetings, and Officer Yanez requested Mr. Castile’s 
driver’s license and proof of insurance.4  Shortly after handing 
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Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their assistance in preparing this 
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 1. Eyder Peralta & Cheryl Corley, The Driving Life and Death of Philando 
Castile, NPR (July 15, 2016, 4:51 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/
2016/07/15/485835272/the-driving-life-and-death-of-philando-castile. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Felony Criminal Complaint at 3, Minnesota v. Yanez, (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2016) 
(No. 62-CR-16-8110), 2016 WL 6800872; Riham Feshir, At Castile Stop, Uneasy 
Questions of Race and Police Training, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (July 14, 2016), 
http://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/07/14/philando-castile-shooting-race-police-
training.  As of January 2017, no individuals have been arrested or charged with the 
July 2, 2016 robbery Officer Yanez referenced when pulling over Mr. Castile.  Tad 
Vezner, Robbery Investigation Mentioned in Philando Castile Stop Remains Open, 
TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Oct. 2, 2016, 11:05 AM), http://www.twincities.com/
2016/10/01/robbery-investigation-mentioned-in-philando-castile-stop-remains-
open/. 
 4. Felony Criminal Complaint, supra note 3. 
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Officer Yanez his insurance card, Mr. Castile told Officer Yanez, 
“Sir, I have to tell you that I do have a firearm on me.”5  
Approximately eight seconds later, Officer Yanez fired seven rounds 
into the vehicle occupied by Mr. Castile, his girlfriend, and her 
young daughter.6  Mr. Castile was fatally wounded.7 
On November 16, 2016, Ramsey County Attorney John Choi 
announced that his office had filed one charge of second degree 
manslaughter and two counts of felony intentional discharge of a 
dangerous weapon against Officer Yanez.8  Prosecutors alleged 
that, “[n]o reasonable officer—knowing, seeing and hearing what 
Officer Yanez did at the time—would have used deadly force under 
these circumstances.”9  Nevertheless, on June 16, 2017, a jury 
acquitted Officer Yanez of all charges.10  Mr. Castile’s story is not 
unique.11  The series of events—from Officer Yanez’s decision to pull 
Mr. Castile over, to the ensuing escalation that culminated in Mr. 
Castile’s death, and finally, the jury’s acquittal—are not unusual, 
especially among Blacks, Hispanics, and other racial minorities.12 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Christina Capecchi & Mitch Smith, Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Is 
Charged with Manslaughter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/11/17/us/philando-castile-shooting-minnesota.html?_r=0. 
 8. See id. (outlining the events leading up to the shooting of Mr. Castile and Mr. 
Choi’s decision to file charges); see also Jon Collins, Riham Feshir & Tim Nelson, 
Officer Charged in Castile Shooting, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016), 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/11/16/officer-charged-in-castile-shooting (“I 
know my decision will be difficult for some in our community to accept, but in order 
to achieve justice we must be willing to do the right thing no matter how hard it may 
seem.”). 
 9. Capecchi & Smith, supra note 7. 
 10. Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-shooting-
trial-philando-castile.html?_r=0. 
 11. See Jana Kooren, The Minneapolis Police Department Is Finally Sharing 
Data on Police Stops. Other Departments Should Follow., ACLU: SPEAK FREELY 
(Sept. 12, 2017, 4:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/reforming-
police-practices/minneapolis-police-department-finally-sharing (explaining that the 
Minneapolis Police Department’s new data system provides the public with 
information on traffic stops; the data shows that “Black people make up around 36 
percent of people stopped but are only 18 percent of the population, while Native 
Americans are 4 percent of the stops but only account for 2 percent of the population. 
The disparities could be even greater because race was marked unknown for 24.4 
percent of the people stopped.”); see also Madison Park, Police Shootings: Trials, 
Convictions Are Rare for Officers, CNN (June 24, 2017, 8:18 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/18/us/police-involved-shooting-cases/index.html 
(listing the names and stories of victims of police shootings and noting that officers 
who killed the following individuals were either acquitted or charges were dropped:  
Lamar Anthony Smith, Sylville Smith, Philando Castile, Terence Crutcher, and 
Freddie Gray). 
 12. See Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in 
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Despite widespread awareness of blatant police brutality and 
lethality,13 the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Utah v. Strieff 
effectually undercuts the legal protections available to racial 
minorities who experience unconstitutional and discriminatory law 
enforcement actions.14  This Note will argue that Strieff and its 
antecedents—Whren, Devenpeck, and Herring—cumulatively 
authorize state-sponsored racial profiling and will amplify low-level 
harassment of racial minorities by law enforcement officers, 
resulting in an increase in instances of non-lethal and lethal use of 
force against racial minorities. 
Part I of this Note examines the integration of racial profiling 
into law enforcement practice nationwide and surveys the legal 
mechanisms intended to protect individuals from such actions.  Part 
II discusses the compounding effects of four United States Supreme 
Court decisions, Whren, Devenpeck, Herring, and Strieff, that 
narrow individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights.  Part III analyzes 
the impact of the Supreme Court’s construction of Fourth 
Amendment protections by mapping the holdings of Strieff and its 
antecedents onto data exposing the prevalence of racial profiling.  
Finally, Part IV argues that Strieff and its antecedents incentivize 
the practice of racial profiling and urges the adoption of a two-prong 
approach to combat these dangerous policies:  First, the Supreme 
Court must acknowledge the role its decisions play in advancing 
racial profiling and police brutality and halt the progression of its 
precedent by endorsing Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Strieff.  
Second, law enforcement precincts must adopt recruitment and 
training requirements that counter racial profiling. 
 
Police Use of Force 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22399, 
2016). 
 13. See Reg Chapman, ‘No Faith in This System’: Activists React to Philando 
Castile Squad Car Video, CBS MINN. (June 20, 2017, 6:39 PM), http://minnesota.cbs
local.com/2017/06/20/community-reaction-castile-video/ (quoting local activist and 
attorney Nekima Levy-Pounds, “Thinking about a situation in which he [referring to 
her son] could be pulled over like that—shot and killed—and the officer simply being 
able to say, ‘I was afraid for my life,’ being used as a justification under the law—it 
boils my blood.”); see also About the Black Lives Matter Network, BLACK LIVES 
MATTER, http://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2017) (“We are 
working for a world where Black lives are no longer systematically targeted for 
demise.”). 
 14. Compare Utah v. Strieff, 36 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (holding that evidence 
discovered pursuant to an unlawful stop is admissible if an officer discovers an active 
warrant after the illegal arrest), with Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) 
(holding that an officer’s subjective reason for initiating a stop need not be closely 
related to the offense upon which the arrest is ultimately made), and Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that pretextual stops are not 
unconstitutional because courts do not look at the subjective intent of law 
enforcement officers). 
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I. Background 
a. Empirical Evidence of Racial Profiling in Law 
Enforcement Practice 
In the United States, approximately 42% of face-to-face 
interactions between individuals and law enforcement officers 
originate from suspected traffic violations.15  In 2011, 13% of Black 
drivers, 10% of White drivers, and 10% of Hispanic drivers were 
pulled over.16  Of all drivers stopped by the police, Black drivers 
were more likely to be ticketed than either White or Hispanic 
drivers even though White drivers comprised a larger percentage of 
total drivers.17  A recent examination of law enforcement data on 
traffic stops and tickets in Cleveland found that Black drivers 
comprised 38.4% of the driving population and yet they received 
59% of all tickets; in contrast, White drivers comprised 54.6% of 
drivers but received 33% of all tickets.18  The research evidences 
that Black drivers are 2.5 times more likely to receive a ticket than 
White drivers.19  Other racial minorities are 1.8 times as likely to 
receive a ticket than White drivers.20 
Racial disparities permeate deeper than disproportionate 
stops and tickets.  To initiate a search of a vehicle, law enforcement 
officers must either have a warrant, be granted consent by the 
individual being searched, or conduct a search incident to an 
arrest.21  Across the United States, 3% of all drivers stopped by 
police were subjected to a search; broken down by race, 2% of all 
White drivers were searched by police compared to 6% of Black 
drivers and 7% of Hispanic drivers.22  Despite searching Black and 
Hispanic drivers far more frequently than White drivers, law 
enforcement officers’ searches of Black and Hispanic drivers were 
 
 15. LYNN LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICE 
BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011 at 3 (Sept. 2013). 
 16. See id. at 1 (noting that Langton & Durose use “Latino” and “Hispanic” 
interchangeably). 
 17. Id. at 7 (noting that 7% of Black drivers and 6% of Hispanic drivers were 
ticketed, whereas 5% of White drivers were ticketed). 
 18. Ronnie A. Dunn, Racial Profiling: A Persistent Civil Rights Challenge Even 
in the Twenty-First Century, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 957, 974 (2016). 
 19. Id. at 973. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.2(b), 131–37 (5th ed. 2012); 
Seth W. Stoughton, Modern Police Practices: Arizona v. Gant’s Illusory Restriction of 
Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1727, 1727 (2010). 
 22. LANGTON & DUROSE, supra note 15, at 9. 
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not found to have resulted in the discovery of higher rates of 
contraband possession.23 
The justification upon which law enforcement officers initiate 
a stop and search of minority drivers often differs from that used to 
support a stop and search of White drivers.24  The authors of a study 
“of 4.5 million traffic stops conducted by the 100 largest police 
departments in North Carolina”25 submit that Hispanic and Black 
drivers “face discrimination in search decisions.”26  Law 
enforcement officers’ disproportionate stopping and searching of 
Hispanic and Black drivers creates a cycle of self-fulfilling 
prophecies:  multiple studies indicate that Black and Hispanic 
drivers are surveilled, stopped, and ticketed more frequently than 
White drivers.27  Cumulatively, these practices rewrite crime 
narratives and lead “many officers [to] believe that querying 
vehicles with African Americans produces more ‘hits.’”28  This 
results in an abundance of adverse consequences for Black and 
Hispanic drivers, including the disproportionate revocation of 
driver’s licenses which leads to skewed arrest rates.29  These 
findings expose the widespread and systematic integration of racial 
profiling into law enforcement tactics throughout the nation. 
 
 23. Camelia Simoiu, Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Problem of Infra-
Marginality in Outcome Tests for Discrimination, 11 THE ANNALS OF APPLIED 
STATISTICS 1193, 1203 (2017) (finding in an empirical study of traffic stops in North 
Carolina that the rate of contraband possession pursuant to a search is 32% for 
Whites, 29% for Blacks, and 19% for Hispanics). 
 24. See id. at 1202–06 (“In nearly all the departments we consider, the inferred 
search thresholds for [B]lack and Hispanic drivers are lower than for [W]hites, 
suggestive of discrimination against these groups.”). 
 25. Id. at 1194. 
 26. Id. at 1194, 1213. 
 27. See Dunn, supra note 18, at 991; Timothy Bates, Driving While Black in 
Suburban Detroit, 7 DU BOIS R. 133, 138 (2010) (indicating that in suburban Detroit, 
Black drivers were disproportionately ticketed compared to White drivers and were 
more likely than White drivers to receive multiple tickets); Albert J. Meehan & 
Michael C. Ponder, Race and Place: The Ecology of Racial Profiling African American 
Motorists, 19 JUST. Q. 399, 422 (2006) (“Profiling, as measured by the proactive 
surveillance of African American drivers, significantly increases as African 
Americans travel farther from ‘[B]lack’ communities and into whiter 
neighborhoods.”). 
 28. Meehan & Ponder, supra note 27, at 418 (2006) (emphasis in original); see 
License Suspensions & Revocations, DEP’T. OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 
http://www.dmvnv.com/dlsuspension.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2017) (noting that a 
finding of failure to pay child support, a conviction of graffiti violation, or underage 
purchase, drinking, or possession of alcohol results in either a driver’s license 
revocation or suspension). 
 29. See Dunn, supra note 18, at 979 (“In that [B]lacks were the overwhelming 
majority of those cited for ‘driving under suspension or revocation’ (seventy-nine 
percent), they were likewise the majority of those arrested. . . . [B]lacks were 
arrested at 1.86 times their percentage of all motorists.”). 
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Racial profiling refers to the use of an individual’s race or 
ethnicity as a “proxy for suspicion of involvement in some form of 
criminal activity or threat.”30  Proving the use of racial profiling as 
an illegal practice is an extremely difficult task that requires 
demonstrable proof that an officer acted with discriminatory 
intent.31  To challenge racial profiling under the Equal Protection 
Clause, an individual must prove both discriminatory intent and 
discriminatory effect.32  One particularly salient and culturally-
relevant example of racial profiling, “driving while black or brown,” 
refers to a common law-enforcement practice where police routinely 
stop Black and Hispanic drivers, based on the color of their skin, 
with the assumption that the driver is breaking a non-moving 
traffic regulation, such as not wearing a seatbelt, or is in possession 
of illicit materials.33  Any traffic violation discovered after an 
allegedly pretextual stop, regardless of gravity, establishes 
sufficient probable cause to validate the stop, even if the initial 
basis for the stop lacked the requisite probable cause.34  This is 
disturbing given the near impossibility of an officer knowing prior 
to a stop that an individual is not wearing a seatbelt, lacks car 
insurance, or has an invalid driver’s license, raising the question as 
to what valid probable cause warranted the stop.35 
The Cleveland study found that Black drivers received 83% of 
all citations for seatbelt violations and 88% of all citations for 
 
 30. Dunn, supra note 18, at 961. 
 31. Meehan & Ponder, supra note 27, at 403; see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 11 
F. App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (holding that the defendant did not prove 
that he was subjected to intentional racial profiling, noting that the government 
provided evidence stating that 6.1% of the driving citations given by the particular 
officer in a three-year period were issued to  Blacks  and that the defendant was the 
only  individual cited for the failure to display a registration sticker); Lee v. City of 
South Charleston, 668 F. Supp. 2d 763 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (noting that despite 
providing evidence of the disparate treatment of minority drivers throughout the 
state, cities, and counties, the study provided by the defendant did not provide 
evidence of racial profiling for the specific city where the defendant was pulled over). 
 32. See Kimberly J. Winbush, Racial Profiling by Law Enforcement Officers in 
Connection with Traffic Stops as Infringement of Federal Constitutional Rights or 
Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 91 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1, 3. 
 33. DAVID A. HARRIS, ACLU, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR 
NATION’S HIGHWAYS (June 1999), https://www.aclu.org/report/driving-while-black-
racial-profiling-our-nations-highways. 
 34. Thomas Fusco, Permissibility Under Fourth Amendment of Detention of 
Motorist by Police, Following Lawful Stop for Traffic Offense, to Investigate Matters 
Not Related to Offense, 118 A.L.R. Fed. 567. 
 35. See Dunn, supra note 18, at 987, 989 (noting that not wearing a seatbelt and 
driving after suspension constitute traffic violations that are not readily observable 
by law enforcement officers). 
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driver’s license offenses;36 another study of a medium-sized  
suburban city evidenced that as Black drivers entered 
predominantly White communities, the likelihood of law 
enforcement conducting a “rolling check” skyrocketed.37  Law 
enforcement officers conduct a “rolling check” by contacting 
dispatch, who will run a vehicle’s information and the social 
security number that corresponds with the license plate.38  In the 
wealthiest neighborhoods of Cleveland, Black drivers are subjected 
to “rolling checks” at rates that are between 325% and 383% higher 
than their representation in the driving population.39  Law 
enforcement officers’ belief that “rolling checks” of Black and 
Hispanic drivers will unearth more traffic violations than “rolling 
checks” of Whites implicitly motivates officers to target Blacks and 
Hispanics, causing racial biases to guide police practice.40 
Evidence of improper motivation within police departments 
can also be found within the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 
investigation into Ferguson, Missouri’s law enforcement and 
judicial practices.41  The investigation, initiated after the fatal 
shooting of Michael Brown, found that revenue generation, rather 
than concern for public safety, structured Ferguson’s law 
enforcement practices.42  The DOJ found that in 2013, the Ferguson 
municipal court issued more than 9,000 arrest warrants, largely for 
low-level offenses such as parking violations, traffic infractions, and 
housing code violations.43  Within Ferguson, Black defendants were 
50% more likely to have an arrest warrant issued than Whites, and 
Blacks accounted for a stunning 92% of all arrest warrants issued, 
despite comprising only 67% of the population in Ferguson.44  The 
DOJ also found that during a six-month period, of those brought to 
 
 36. Id. at 982. 
 37. Meehan & Ponder, supra note 27, at 417. 
 38. Dunn, supra note 18, at 988. 
 39. Meehan & Ponder, supra note 27, at 417. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (March 4, 2015) https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_
department_report.pdf (investigating the unlawful practices and conduct in the 
Ferguson Police Department) [hereinafter FERGUSON INVESTIGATION]. 
 42. Id. at 2. 
 43. See id. at 3 (“Jail time would be considered far too harsh a penalty for the 
great majority of these code violations, yet Ferguson’s municipal court routinely 
issues warrants for people to be arrested and incarcerated for failing to timely pay 
related fines and fees.”).  Apart from the legal consequences that Blacks and 
Hispanics face due to practices of racial profiling, these drivers also experience the 
use of non-lethal force at higher rates.  Fryer, Jr., supra note 12, at 47 tbl.2A. 
 44. FERGUSON INVESTIGATION, supra note 41, at 6. 
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jail due only to an outstanding warrant, 96% were Black.45  
Similarly, during a two-year period, the Ferguson Police 
Department arrested 460 individuals during traffic stops due only 
to outstanding arrest warrants; of those arrested, 96% were Black.46  
The racial disparities in warrant issuance creates further 
challenges for minorities because “violations that would normally 
not result in a penalty of imprisonment can, and frequently do, lead 
to municipal warrants, arrests, and jail time.”47 
Increased latitude to target racial minorities can turn lethal 
when combined with law enforcement officers’ proclivity for unsafe 
and escalated use-of-force tactics.  A recent DOJ investigation into 
the City of Chicago’s Police Department (CPD) examined whether 
the department employed unlawful policies and practices.48  After 
interviewing hundreds of CPD staff, community organizations, and 
families of individuals killed by CPD, and after reviewing CPD 
policies, procedures, and training programs, the DOJ concluded 
that “CPD officers’ force practices unnecessarily endanger 
themselves and others and result in unnecessary and avoidable 
shootings and other uses of force,” in violation of the United States 
Constitution.49  Specifically, the report found that CPD officers, 
contrary to CPD policy, employ tactics that place themselves and 
the public in danger:  shooting at vehicles, unsafely using their 
vehicles, and initiating “tactically unsound and unnecessary” foot 
pursuits that often conclude “with officers unreasonably shooting 
someone—including unarmed individuals.”50  The DOJ report 
details unnecessary, fatal interactions:  CPD officers fired forty-five 
rounds at an unarmed man, fatally shot an unarmed man in the 
back, and shot an unarmed man lying on the ground three times in 
the back, killing him.51  The DOJ found that the CPD’s use of non-
lethal and lethal force violated the Fourth Amendment as well as 
CPD policy.52 
Discriminatory use of force is not limited to Chicago:  it 
plagues communities across the nation.  In 2016, Roland Fryer 
published a working paper detailing findings of racial disparities in 
 
 45. Id. at 5. 
 46. Id. at 57. 
 47. Id. at 9. 
 48. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/
925846/download. 
 49. Id. at 2, 4. 
 50. Id. at 5. 
 51. Id. at 25–26. 
 52. Id. at 25, 32. 
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police use of force.53  Fryer’s team controlled for demographics, 
including age and gender, as well as encounter characteristics such 
as whether the civilian gave the officer identification, if the location 
of the interaction was in a high- or low-crime area, and how the 
civilian reportedly behaved.54  The study confirmed that law 
enforcement is more likely to touch, push, handcuff, use pepper 
spray or a baton, or draw and point their weapons at Blacks and 
Hispanics than Whites.55  Controversially, the study did not find 
evidence of racial bias in police shootings of civilians.56 
According to Fryer, as a law enforcement officer increases the 
level of force used—for example when an encounter escalates from 
pushing an individual against the wall to the use of pepper spray—
the likelihood that the civilian, regardless of race, is subjected to 
further increased use of force decreases.57  Despite the lower 
likelihood of higher-level uses of force, Fryer found that law 
enforcement officers’ use of both lethal and non-lethal force 
disproportionately impacts Blacks and Hispanics.58  For example, 
compared to Whites, Blacks and Hispanics are approximately 53% 
more likely to have force used against them.59  Amongst all civilians, 
there is a 0.26% likelihood that a law enforcement officer will draw 
their weapon; however, law enforcement officers are 21.3% more 
likely to draw their weapon when interacting with Blacks than 
Whites.60  Upon arrest, Blacks and Hispanics are approximately 7% 
more likely to be subjected to the use of force than Whites.61  The 
racial difference in the use of force by law enforcement does not 
change based on the civilian’s gender or the race of the officer.62  
Fryer concludes that compared to Whites, Blacks and Hispanics, 
have very different interactions with law enforcement—
interactions that are consistent with, though definitely not 
proof of, some form of discrimination.  Including myriad 
controls designed to account for civilian demographics, 
 
 53. Fryer, Jr., supra note 12. 
 54. See id. at 3 (noting that none of the controls altered the findings of the study). 
 55. Id. at 4; Quoctrung Bui & Amanda Cox, Surprising New Evidence Shows Bias 
in Police Use of Force but Not in Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/upshot/surprising-new-evidence-shows-bias-in-
police-use-of-force-but-not-in-shootings.html. 
 56. See Bui & Cox, supra note 55 (quoting Roland G. Fryer, “[i]t is the most 
surprising result of my career”). 
 57. Fryer, Jr., supra note 12, at 4. 
 58. Id. at 4. 
 59. Id. at 4, 16. 
 60. Id. at 4. 
 61. Id. at 19. 
 62. Id. at 21. 
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encounter characteristics, civilian behavior, eventual outcomes 
of the interaction and year reduces, but cannot eliminate, racial 
differences in non-lethal use of force.63 
b. Evidence of the Judiciary Endorsing Police Practices of 
Racial Profiling 
Prior to the holdings of Strieff and its antecedents—Whren v. 
United States, Devenpeck v. Alford, and Herring v. United States—
an average motorist who obeyed traffic laws and vehicle safety 
requirements could rationally presume, absent a valid warrant or 
their explicit consent, that police could not legally stop and search 
their vehicle.64  Previously, the Supreme Court maintained that 
vehicles, due to their mobility, would only be subject to a search 
without a warrant so long as an officer had probable cause to believe 
that there was contraband in the vehicle.65  The probable cause 
standard requires that an officer have “[a] reasonable ground to 
suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime or 
that a place contains specific items connected with a crime.”66  
However, Strieff and its antecedents, combined with the common 
practice of racial profiling, eviscerate that expectation for motorists, 
disproportionately so for racial minorities. 
In 1996, the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to 
address law enforcement’s use of racial profiling in traffic stops 
when it heard Whren v. United States.67  In Whren, plainclothes law 
enforcement officers observed a vehicle occupied by two young Black 
men waiting at a stop sign for more than twenty seconds.68  Officers 
turned their vehicle around and began to pursue the vehicle, which 
had begun to drive away at an “unreasonable” speed.69  After pulling 
their squad car alongside the vehicle, one of the officers approached 
the vehicle and saw two bags filled with white powder.70  Both the 
driver and the passenger were arrested.71  The defendants 
challenged the legality of the stop and seizure of the contraband, 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. See David A. Moran, The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle Doctrine: Stop and 
Search Any Car at Any Time, 47 VILL. L. REV. 815, 819 (2002). 
 65. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925); see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause . . . .”). 
 66. Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 67. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 68. Id. at 808, 810. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 809. 
 71. Id. 
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arguing that the initial traffic stop was pretextual and that the 
officers lacked both the probable cause and reasonable suspicion 
necessary to initiate the search for drugs.72 
The Court ruled that the constitutionality of a traffic stop 
neither hinges on “the actual motivations of the individual officers 
involved” nor the “collective consciousness of law enforcement.”73  
This decision established that an individual law enforcement 
officer’s subjective motivations for conducting a traffic stop, even if 
admittedly pretextual, do not invalidate a stop and search, “even if 
a reasonable officer” in the same situation “would not have stopped 
the motorist.”74  Additionally, the Court held that future challenges 
to discriminatory policing must be pursued through the Equal 
Protection Clause rather than the Fourth Amendment.75  In order 
for a law enforcement officer’s stop and search to survive a Fourth 
Amendment challenge, the officer must simply demonstrate that 
they had probable cause to initiate the stop.76 
Building upon Whren, the Court, in Devenpeck v. Alford, was 
asked to decide whether an officer’s arrest of an individual without 
probable cause invalidates subsequent arrest-able offenses that are 
not “closely related” to the initial offense.77  In November 1997, the 
defendant saw a vehicle stopped on the side of the road, pulled his 
car over, and began assisting the stranded driver.78  Shortly after 
the defendant started helping the motorist, a law enforcement 
officer arrived.79  Upon seeing the law enforcement officer, the 
defendant returned to his car and drove away.80  The stranded 
motorist informed the officer that they had the impression that the 
defendant was a police officer.81  The law enforcement officer, 
believing that the defendant was impersonating a police officer, 
pulled over the defendant.82  The defendant recorded his interaction 
with the officer and was arrested for the unrelated and legal act of 
recording a law enforcement officer.83 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 813, 815. 
 74. Id. at 806. 
 75. Id. at 813. 
 76. Id. at 818. 
 77. 543 U.S. 146, 148 (2004). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 150. 
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In deciding Devenpeck, the Court held that an officer’s 
subjective rationale for conducting a stop “need not be the criminal 
offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.”84  The 
Court, building off the holding in Whren that an officer’s subjective 
intent is immaterial, articulated that the offense which establishes 
probable cause does not need to be “closely related” to the violation 
used to justify the arrest.85  The Court voiced its concern that 
invalidating an arrest based on a law enforcement officer’s 
expressed subjective rationale for arresting an individual, such as 
racial bias, would arbitrarily expand individuals’ Fourth 
Amendment protections and encourage officers to either cease 
explaining to arrestees the reason for their arrest or officers would 
feel pressured to list every possible reason for an arrest.86  
Ultimately, the Court validated an arrest for a non-existent 
offense.87  Combined, Whren and Devenpeck effectively shield law 
enforcement officers’ racially-motivated, pretextual reasons for 
arrest from judicial scrutiny even if the underlying basis for the stop 
and search was improper.88 
The Court’s permissive attitude toward law enforcement’s 
practice of racial profiling is further weaponized in Herring v. 
United States.  In Herring, the Court was asked to determine 
whether an individual who was arrested pursuant to a law 
enforcement officer’s inaccurate belief that there was an active 
arrest warrant suffered a constitutional violation.89  When law 
enforcement officers learned that Mr. Herring was retrieving an 
item from his impounded vehicle, they investigated whether he had 
any active warrants.90  After learning there was an outstanding 
warrant for Mr. Herring, officers arrested him and found that he 
was in possession of methamphetamine and a firearm.91  However, 
the warrant that facilitated the arrest had been recalled months 
earlier but, due to a clerical error, still appeared in the database.92  
Mr. Herring challenged the legality of the stop and search and 
 
 84. Id. at 153–54. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 154–55. 
 87. Brian J. Foley, Policing from the Gut: Anti-Intellectualism in American 
Criminal Procedure, 69 MD. L. REV. 261, 319 (2010). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 136–37 (2009). 
 90. Id. at 137. 
 91. Id. (noting that Herring, as a felon, could not possess a firearm). 
 92. Id. at 137–38. 
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asked that the Court apply the exclusionary rule to the unlawfully 
seized evidence.93 
The Court accepted the factual finding that the clerk who 
failed to maintain accurate records did not do so deliberately and 
held that the exclusionary rule would not apply to the evidence 
obtained in the search of Mr. Herring.94  The Court stated that the 
mere violation of a constitutional right does not automatically make 
a stop and search unreasonable and expanded the breadth of the 
ruling by holding that a probable cause determination based on 
false information does not necessitate the application of the 
exclusionary rule.95  The Court’s decision to withhold the 
exclusionary rule in cases of clear error denies defendants an 
important remedy when their Fourth Amendment rights have been 
violated.96 
Most recently, in Utah v. Strieff, the Court was asked to 
determine whether incriminating evidence obtained pursuant to a 
law enforcement officer’s unconstitutional stop and search of an 
individual, which resulted in the discovery of a valid arrest warrant, 
was admissible.97  In 2006, a law enforcement officer saw Mr. Strieff 
leave a suspected narcotics house.98  The officer followed Mr. Strieff 
and requested he produce his identification, which, when ran, 
turned up an active arrest warrant for a minor traffic violation.99  
Accordingly, the officer searched Mr. Strieff, discovered drug 
paraphernalia and methamphetamine, and arrested him.100 
Despite finding that the officer may have acted negligently and 
did not have probable cause to stop Mr. Strieff, the Court validated 
the admission of the evidence discovered after the illegal stop 
because, the Court rationalized, nothing legally precluded the 
officer from approaching the suspect and the officer’s actions were 
not indicative of systemic violations of individuals’ Fourth 
Amendment rights.101  As pertains to the exclusionary rule, the 
Court found that evidence discovered pursuant to an unlawful stop 
is admissible if an officer discovers an active warrant after the 
illegal stop.102  Ultimately, the Court’s decision overlooks illegal law 
 
 93. Id. at 138. 
 94. Id. at 146. 
 95. Id. at 141. 
 96. Id. at 152–53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 97. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016). 
 98. Id. at 2060. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 2063. 
 102. Id. 
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enforcement stops so long as the illegal stop results in the discovery 
of an outstanding warrant for even very minor offenses.103 
II. Whren, Devenpeck, Herring, and Strieff: The Gutting of 
Fourth Amendment Protections 
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court restricted 
the right of law enforcement officers to initiate a search incident to 
arrest.104  The Court required that the search be limited to the 
accused individual, the premises subject to their physical control, 
and that the object sought be either a weapon or object used to 
commit a crime.105  The Court’s holdings in Strieff and its 
antecedents undercut these restrictions and validate racially  
motivated, pretextual stops that lack probable cause and are found 
to have been unwarranted ex post facto. 
In Whren, the Court held that a law enforcement officer’s 
pretextual, racially motivated stop does not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment violation.106  The Court’s ruling allows the subjective, 
racially discriminatory motivations of law enforcement officers to be 
scrubbed from the factual record, ultimately sanitizing offensive 
facts from judicial review.  The Court, by ignoring racially 
motivated police actions, endorses a panoply of blatantly pretextual, 
racial profiling tactics.107  In practice, these rulings enabled an 
increase in pretextual, racially motivated stops.108  The Whren 
Court further damaged the ability of arrestees to combat improper 
stops when it redirected legal challenges to racially motivated police 
actions to the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Fourth 
Amendment.109  By relegating future legal actions to the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Court requires defendants to provide 
 
 103. Id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 104. P. A. Agabin, Annotation, Lawfulness of Search of Motor Vehicle Following 
Arrest for Traffic Violation, 10 A.L.R.3d Art. 1 (2017). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: 
Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 882, 884 (2015). 
 107. See id. at 884–85. See generally Brooks Holland, Racial Profiling and a 
Punitive Exclusionary Rule, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 29 (2010) (arguing 
that the Court has too narrowly prohibited the subjection of racial profiling to 
constitutional scrutiny). 
 108. See David A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case Study 
of the “New Federalism” in Constitutional and Criminal Procedure, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 367, 384 (2010). 
 109. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also Chin & 
Vernon, supra note 106, at 919 (noting that despite the unconstitutionality of 
discriminatory conduct, discriminatory law enforcement actions often survive the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness test). 
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evidence of a facially discriminatory law or policy, or a facially 
neutral law or policy that was passed due to explicit racial animus; 
contrastingly, Fourth Amendment challenges only require evidence 
that the stop and search was unreasonable.110 
In Devenpeck, the Court ruled that an officer’s subjective 
reason for initiating a stop, so long as it satisfies the low threshold 
of probable cause, does not need to be “closely related” to the offense 
that the officer ultimately stops the suspect for.111  When combined 
with Whren, Devenpeck permits law enforcement officers, to stop an 
individual for pretextual, racially motivated reasons and conduct an 
arrest for an offense completely unrelated to the supposed offense 
that established sufficient probable cause to validate the stop.112  
For example, an officer seeing a Black driver can stop that 
individual despite the individual not having visibly broken any 
laws.  If the officer discovers that the individual is in violation of a 
law, for example by not wearing a seatbelt or driving with a revoked 
driver’s license, the officer may arrest the individual, even if the stop 
was founded on racist beliefs. 
In Herring, the Court held that negligent record keeping that 
results in an otherwise illegal arrest does not necessarily render 
evidence inadmissible.113  In Strieff, the Court ruled that evidence 
obtained pursuant to an unconstitutional stop is admissible so long 
as the officer discovers that the individual has an active warrant.114  
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Strieff outlines the dangerously 
expansive implications of the majority opinion: 
This case allows the police to stop you on the street, demand 
your identification, and check it for outstanding traffic 
warrants—even if you are doing nothing wrong.  If the officer 
discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay, courts will now 
excuse his illegal stop and will admit into evidence anything he 
happens to find by searching you after arresting you on the 
 
 110. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“Disproportionate impact 
is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination 
forbidden by the Constitution.  Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule . . . that 
racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny . . . .”) (citations 
omitted); see also Chin & Vernon, supra note 106, at 884–886 (“Although Whren 
recognized that another provision of the Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited racial discrimination, the Court did not 
mention that successful claims of selective enforcement are vanishingly small.”). 
 111. See 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004). 
 112. See id.; Whren, 517 U.S. at 806. 
 113. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009) (“We do not 
suggest that all recordkeeping errors by the police are immune from the exclusionary 
rule.”). 
 114. See 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016). 
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warrant.115 
The aggregate effect of Strieff and its antecedents is the 
judicial validation of racially motivated stops that lack the requisite 
probable cause, so long as the individual being stopped is 
retroactively found to have an active warrant, even if the warrant 
is no longer active, but still in the system due to administrative 
negligence.116 
III. The Cumulative Impact of Strieff and its Antecedents 
on Racial Minorities’ Likelihood of Low-Level 
Harassment by Law Enforcement 
In 2014, forty states reported that they maintained warrant 
files within a statewide database.117  Among those forty states, 
there are more than 7,800,000 active warrants.118  Of those 
warrants, approximately 725,000 are felony level, almost 3,900,000 
are misdemeanor warrants, and nearly 860,000 are for “other” 
offenses.119  In light of Strieff and its antecedents, the prevalence of 
active warrants is cause for concern for all individuals walking or 
driving the streets of the United States.120  The astronomical 
number of active warrants means that millions of individuals, 
particularly racial minorities, are at risk of being stopped for 
pretextual reasons and searched incident to the existence of a 
 
 115. Id. at 2064 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 116. Compare id. at 2059 (holding that evidence discovered pursuant to an 
unlawful stop is admissible if an officer discovers an active warrant after the illegal 
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 118. Id. at 4. 
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 120. See Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1609, 1664 (2012) (“[I]n light of police secrecy and defects in recordkeeping, 
data on searches and warrants is scarce.”). 
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warrant, even if the warrant is for a low-level offense or has been 
withdrawn. 
The majority of active arrest warrants are for low-level 
offenses, such as unpaid fines or misdemeanor offenses—offenses 
which disproportionately impact racial minorities, suggesting that 
the negative effects of Strieff and its antecedents will be more potent 
in Black and Hispanic communities than in White communities.121  
Because some law enforcement officers believe that targeting racial 
minorities is a good and effective practice, these decisions will 
aggressively mutate racial profiling from an ineffective practice into 
a technique that law enforcement officers can employ to over-
criminalize Black and Hispanic communities.122  Strieff and its 
antecedents’ legal accommodation for racial profiling, when grafted 
onto the abundance of readily available criminal offenses123 and the 
devastating number of outstanding warrants, transforms the 
United States into a chilling landscape:  law enforcement officers 
can stop an individual for pretextual reasons and retroactively 
validate the discriminatory action by arresting the individual for an 
unrelated offense or by discovering an apparently active arrest 
warrant.124  These rulings allow law enforcement officers to 
(continue to) focus their efforts on racial minorities,125 target 
specific neighborhoods, and incarcerate racial minorities at rates 
that exceed their percentage of both the general and crime-
committing populations.126  Combined, these cases embolden the 
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use of racial profiling and bar victims of these practice from utilizing 
the Fourth Amendment to protect themselves from these 
reprehensible violations of their constitutional rights. 
IV. A Perverse Incentive With a Negative Impact 
The rulings of Strieff and its antecedents perversely 
incentivize the expansion of racial profiling by law enforcement 
officers.  The rulings fail to prohibit racially motivated stops and 
permit law enforcement officers to retroactively justify illegal stops 
by either finding another reason to initiate an arrest or by 
discovering an arrest warrant.127  These cases add racial profiling 
to law enforcement officers’ toolboxes, restrict and endanger the 
physical liberties and physical safety of racial minorities, and 
disassemble the constitutional barriers to discriminatory 
policing.128  To weed out the widespread practice of racial profiling, 
a two-pronged approach must be adopted:  (a) the Supreme Court 
must overturn Strieff and its antecedents and take accountability 
for its complicity in the practice of racial profiling; (b) because 
judicial rulings provide legal cover for—but are not the genesis of—
racial profiling, law enforcement precincts and academies must 
actively combat racially motivated practices by utilizing 
recruitment and training programs that acknowledge and confront 
racial profiling. 
a. Prong 1: Overturn Strieff and its Antecedents and End 
the Era of Judicial Complicity in Racial Profiling 
Roland Fryer’s empirical study of police use of force examined 
multiple data sets from across the United States to determine 
whether different racial groups are disparately subjected to police 
use of lethal and non-lethal force.129  One of the programs Fryer 
examined was New York City’s Stop, Question, and Frisk Program 
(“Stop and Frisk”).130  Through the Stop and Frisk Program,131 law 
 
 127. Compare Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059 (holding that evidence discovered 
pursuant to an unlawful stop is admissible if an officer discovers an active warrant 
after the illegal stop), with Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 146 (holding that an officer’s 
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 129. See Fryer, Jr., supra note 12, at 2–6. 
 130. Id. at 2. 
 131. See RUN THE JEWELS, Early, on RUN THE JEWELS 2 (Mass Appeal) (2014) 
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enforcement officers could stop an individual, question them, and 
search, or frisk, that person for weapons or illicit items.132  Fryer’s 
team examined approximately five million instances of police 
interactions with individuals through Stop and Frisk.133  Stop and 
Frisk is relevant to this Article because it mirrors the results of 
Strieff and its antecedents in that neither requires law enforcement 
officers to have probable cause prior to initiating a stop.134  
Moreover, under both, once a stop has been initiated, law 
enforcement officers have a plethora of options to retroactively 
validate an otherwise illegal stop and search.135 
Fryer’s analysis of Stop and Frisk sheds valuable insight into 
the possible repercussions of the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Strieff and its antecedents.  After controlling for a number of 
variables,136 which, did notably “little to alter the results,”137 the 
study found that Blacks, who comprised 58% of all stops, were the 
most likely to be stopped, followed by Hispanics, who experienced 
25% of stops, and Whites, who represented a paltry 10% of all 
stops.138  If these numbers reflected a policy of randomly stopping 
individuals on the street, Blacks would proportionally comprise 
25.5% of stops—less than half the rate revealed by the study.139 
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Equally concerning are Fyer’s findings regarding the use of 
non-lethal force against racial minorities through Stop and Frisk.  
During the Stop and Frisk program, after controlling for civilian 
behavior, Blacks and Hispanics were nearly 53% more likely to have 
force used against them compared to Whites.140  While the use of 
high-level force—such as the use of a baton or pepper spray—is less 
likely than low-level uses of force—such as an officer placing their 
hands on an individual or pushing them into a wall—high-level uses 
of force were more likely to be used against Blacks than Whites.141  
After examining “perfectly compliant individuals and control[ling] 
for civilian, officer, encounter and location variables, [B]lack 
civilians are 21.1[%] more likely to have any force used against 
them compared to [W]hite civilians with the same reported 
compliance behavior.”142 
In 2013, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York held that New York’s Stop and Frisk was 
racially discriminatory.143  The court’s decision relied on evidence 
that the New York City Police Department (NYPD) stopped Blacks 
and Hispanics at higher rates than Whites, that the stops occurred 
in certain pockets of the city, that disproportionate amounts of force 
were used by law enforcement against Blacks and Hispanics 
compared to Whites, and that the stops of Blacks and Hispanics 
were initiated with less legal justification than the stops of 
Whites.144  The court also acknowledged the failure of courts to 
combat racial profiling, stating “courts should ‘not condone racially 
motivated police behavior’ and must ‘take seriously an allegation of 
racial profiling.’”145  Unfortunately, neither the district court’s 
holding nor its admonishment motivated the Supreme Court to 
introspectively examine its role in furthering racial profiling and 
the impacts of its holdings on racial minorities when it ruled in 
Strieff.146 
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The documented racial disparities in the use of force stemming 
from Stop and Frisk and the similarities between Stop and Frisk 
and Strieff and its antecedents substantiates concerns that the 
Court’s recent rulings may increase law enforcement officers’ 
propensity to harass racial minorities.  Moreover, the potential for 
low-level harassment to escalate to non-lethal force and lethal force 
demands that the Court follow Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, heed 
the lower court’s warning, and rigorously re-examine Strieff and its 
antecedents.147 
b. Prong 2: All Levels of Law Enforcement Must Proactively 
Counter Their Role in Perpetuating Racial Profiling 
In light of Donald Trump’s statements during his 2016 
presidential campaign endorsing New York City’s unconstitutional 
Stop and Frisk program148 and his administration’s commitment to 
restore “law and order,”149 it is unlikely that the current Executive 
branch will act to correct the damaging practices and outcomes 
stemming from the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.150  Without federal encouragement and guidance in 
changing the nationwide equivalent of Stop and Frisk, and the 
improbability of the judiciary overturning Strieff and its 
antecedents, individual law enforcement precincts should take the 
initiative to combat racial profiling and the subsequent use of 
force.151 
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Strieff and its antecedents, when taken to their natural end, 
will increase police brutality which will further damage 
relationships between law enforcement and Black and Hispanic 
communities.152  One way precincts can combat racial profiling is to 
require that law enforcement academies provide more 
comprehensive training to recruits.  Outside of field training, law 
enforcement recruits complete approximately 840 hours of 
training.153  Approximately 96% of training academies utilize a 
classroom structure for basic training.154 Between 2006 and 2013, 
the number of academies that included training on community 
policing increased from 92% to 97% percent.155  However, on 
average, academies only required trainees to complete 43 hours of 
community policing training, of which only 12 hours were dedicated 
to cultural diversity and human relations.156  Despite an abundance 
of data exposing the prevalence and inefficiency of racial profiling, 
law enforcement academies spend an inadequate amount of time 
teaching recruits about how to professionally interact with racial 
minorities.  Without proper training, it is possible that law 
enforcement officers will be guided by racial animus, instead of best 
practice, in deciding who to stop, when to search, and what level of 
force to exact upon racial minorities. 
Data concerning the average training requirements for de-
escalation tactics was lumped into the broad category of “use of 
force” requirements, which, in total, averaged a meager 21 hours.157  
Precincts ought to demand that academies increase the number of 
hours of training concerning de-escalation techniques in order to 
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.3a34464d06f7 (quoting Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who commented on the 
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Department of Justice will implement reforms to the Chicago and Ferguson Police 
Departments). 
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file/836486/download (last accessed Nov. 14, 2017) (emphasizing the importance of 
law enforcement relationships with communities they interact with). 
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 157. Id. at 5. 
2018] Gutting the Fourth Amendment 167 
reduce unnecessary escalation, which predominantly impacts racial 
minorities.  As evidenced in the case of Philando Castile and noted 
in the DOJ report on its investigation of the Chicago Police 
Department, racially imbalanced, lethal escalation is ingrained in 
everyday policing and has fatal consequences—it is the duty of 
academies and precincts to proactively counter this practice by 
comprehensively educating law enforcement officers on de-
escalation techniques as well as teaching officers how to avoid 
escalation in the first case. 
Conclusion 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Strieff and its antecedents 
concurrently expand legal protections for law enforcement officers’ 
discriminatory actions while gutting constitutional protections for 
individuals.  The effects of these decisions, when mapped onto the 
widespread use of racial profiling by law enforcement, legalize law 
enforcement officers’ rampant practice of exploiting racial biases to 
stop and search racial minorities without probable cause.  Over 
time, this practice will further transform racial profiling into a self-
fulfilling prophecy:  law enforcement officers will monitor and over-
criminalize the otherwise legal activities of racial minorities.  
Combined, these cases will increase law enforcement officer’s low-
level, and potentially high-level, harassment of racial minorities, 
resulting in an increase in law enforcement officers’ use of non-
lethal and potentially-lethal force against racial minorities.  To 
combat this, a two-prong approach is necessary:  First, the Supreme 
Court must endorse Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Strieff and 
overturn its rulings in Strieff and its antecedents.  Second, law 
enforcement precincts and training academies should increase 
recruits’ required training on community policing and de-escalation 
techniques. 
